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Introduction
The role of technology in foreign direct investment (FDI) is a source of some ambiguity. Within the dominant 'eclectic paradigm' (Dunning, 1988 ) the role of technology seems clear enough. The paradigm suggests that where a company has some 'ownership' (i.e. competitive) advantage over its rivals, and where for reasons of property rights protection licensing is unsafe, a company will set up production facilities in a foreign country through FDI, as long as there are specific advantages in the host country which make FDI preferable to exporting. Since much of the discussion of ownership advantages is couched in terms of technology and/or management expertise, there is therefore a strong a priori assumption that FDI will be an important method by which technology is transferred internationally from home to host countries.
However, recent theoretical work has given renewed impetus to something long recognised in the literature, that a possible motive for FDI is not to exploit proprietary technology, but to access it: thus technology sourcing may be the motive for FDI. For example, Fosfuri and Motta (1999) question the need for firm-specific advantages to give rise to multinational activity, and provide a formal model of FDI in which the motivation is not to exploit existing technological advantages in a foreign country, but to access such technology and transfer it from the host economy to the investing multinational corporation via spillover effects. This possibility has had some policy influence in the United States and Europe, with concerns that the technological base of these economies may be at risk through the technology sourcing activities of Japanese and US corporations respectively (Kogut and Chang 1991; Neven and Siotis 1996) The recent literature on the internationalization of R&D suggests that this concern may be well placed (Cantwell, 1995; Cantwell and Janne 1999; Kuemmerle, 1999a Kuemmerle, , 1999b Patel and Vega, 1999) . This literature stresses a range of reasons for FDI in R&D, much of which is concerned with the relative technological strengths of the capital exporting (i.e. 'home') firm or country versus that of the host. The evidence suggests that corporations are increasingly moving their R&D facilities abroad, and that this is being done as part of a strategic move away from merely adapting 'core' technology to a foreign market towards a much more central role in product innovation and development. In addition, the literature suggests that there is a growing willingness to locate such facilities close to leading centres of research and innovation specifically with a view to absorbing learning spillovers from geographical proximity to such sites (Pearce, 1999; Niosi, 1999; Serapio and Dalton, 1999) . This paper adds to the debate by performing a panel analysis of manufacturing FDI flows between the United States and its major recipient/investing countries which not only examines the technology sourcing versus technology exploitation hypotheses for the sample overall, but does so separately for those sectors and countries which the conceptual literature identifies as being most likely to exhibit these contrasting forms of investing behaviour (Patel and Vega, 1999) . The next section provides an overview of the literature on technology sourcing and related issues. This is followed by the development of the empirical model, and a discussion of the results for both outward and inward FDI between the United States and seven major OECD countries. The paper concludes that, while there is evidence that FDI tends to be attracted to research-intensive sectors, there is relatively little support for the technology sourcing hypothesis for FDI flows between the United States and other major OECD countries.
Evidence on Technology Sourcing
As noted by Neven and Siotis (1996) , there has been considerable concern by some countries that domestic technology can be "tapped into" by foreign investors. This can be the case when foreign firms, operating in home countries where the technological base is relatively weak in a chosen sector, choose to invest in leading centres of research and development excellence, for example by developing collaborations between local R&D laboratories and universities. Much of the work in this area has therefore tended to concentrate on the internationalisation of R&D and related activities. Kuemmerle (1999a) distinguishes between 'home-base exploiting' (HBE) FDI and 'home-base augmenting' (HBA) FDI. The former is undertaken in order to exploit firm-specific advantages abroad, while the latter is FDI undertaken to access unique resources and capture externalities created locally. His subsequent empirical work (Kuemmerle 1999b) finds evidence that that HBE and HBA research sites are subject to different locational determinants. Patel and Vega (1999) Although there has been no direct testing of these categories, there is considerable survey-based evidence on technology sourcing as a motive for internationalising R&D. Using survey evidence for Swedish chemical and engineering industries, Håkanson and Nobel (1993) find relatively limited evidence of technology sourcing; of a total of 172 Swedish research laboratories set up abroad, only 13 were set up with the sole intention of sourcing foreign technology. However, Gassmann and von Zedtwitz (1999) find strong evidence that when foreign technology development becomes too significant to ignore companies establish 'listening posts' in areas of technological expertise around the World. In a study of patent citations in the US semiconductor industry, Almeida (1996) finds that foreign subsidiaries make more use of sector and geographically specific knowledge than do domestic firms, and concludes that Korean and European subsidiaries in particular use 'knowledge sourcing' from US firms to upgrade their technological ability in areas in which they are relatively weak. An analysis of foreign R&D direct investment in the United States by Serapio and Dalton (1999) concludes that the nature of such investment is changing, with more emphasis on gaining direct access to American technology and expertise, especially in biotechnology and electronics. They also conclude that foreign firms are increasingly investing in R&D sites in the United States to access technologies which are complementary to those of the investing firms. Pearce (1999) comes to broadly similar conclusions from a survey of multinational corporations' production and laboratory facilities in the UK. Companies which previously exerted rather tight control over their R&D sites are now granting more autonomy and empowerment to R&D laboratories situated abroad. It appears that, whereas in the 1970s and early 1980s organisations saw establishing R&D outlets abroad as little more than adapting products to local markets as hypothesised by the product life cycle hypothesis, during the 1990s organisations began to take a more decentralised approach to R&D (Niosi 1999) . The emphasis tends to be on an integrated strategy with co-ordination of R&D resources across national boundaries.
There is evidence, however, that investment abroad is not merely restricted to firms operating in areas of domestic weakness. For example, Cantwell and Janne (1999) examine European firm patents granted in the United States from 1969 to 1995 and find evidence that leading multinationals operating in major European centres in their own activity tend to carry out technological activity abroad which is relatively differentiated from their domestic technological strengths. Conversely, firms from lower order centres tend to locate research in their own domestic fields of technological strength, extending the depth of their established lines of activity in the most important centre in the locational hierarchy of their industry. This work, and that of Serapio and Dalton (1999) reviewed above, suggests that it is mistaken to imagine that 'technology sourcing' always involves technologically weak countries accessing the technology of those which are technologically strong; technology sourcing may occur where both parties are absolutely strong in technology, but where one is rather stronger than the other i.e. the 'Type 3' investment of Patel and Vega (1999) . Indirect support for this contention comes from Chen and Chen's (1998) work on network linkages. They find that Taiwanese firms use strategic network connections to gain access to strategic assets in foreign countries, especially the United States. This strategic linkage approach explicitly views FDI as an attempt to acquire knowledge that reinforces the strengths of the investor, or complements the investor's weaknesses.
Recent research on domestic R&D appears to lend some indirect support for the technology sourcing hypothesis. Driffield and Munday (2000) study inward investment into the United Kingdom between 1984 and 1992, and find evidence that R&D intensity in the relevant UK sector has a significantly positive effect on inward FDI. Intriguingly, Driffield and Munday explain this as evidence of the importance of proprietary knowledge as a source of ownership advantage, rather than as evidence of technology sourcing. Vannoni (1999) examines numbers of Italian firm entries and exits into the EU and finds that R&D expenditures in host country industries have a significant impact on Italian firm entry abroad. Barriers to entry with regards to public procurement policies, distance from Italy, and unit labour costs in host countries were also found to be important.
Only a handful of studies have attempted direct econometric analysis on the specific issue of technology sourcing. Kogut and Chang (1991) examine the entry of Japanese firms into specific US sectors from 1976 to 1987, and use an R&D difference variable in an attempt to account for technology sourcing as a potential motive for Japanese entry into US markets. The intuition is that should the US sector in question experience a higher R&D intensity relative to the Japanese sector, then this would encourage Japanese firms who wish to source US technology to set up in the United States 1 . The authors found that US R&D intensities and innovation frequencies were positively associated with Japanese entry, but the coefficients for these variables were insignificant. Barriers to entry and especially the tariff-jumping motive were found to be more important, providing further evidence that Japanese investment abroad tends to be particularly sensitive to trade barriers. Only in the case of joint ventures did Kogut and Chang find evidence that US-Japanese R&D differentials encouraged inward investment. In a similar vein Neven and Siotis (1996) examined both Japanese and US investment into the EC together with intra EC FDI flows.
Using Kogut and Chang's R&D difference variable to examine the possibility of technological sourcing, Neven and Siotis examine actual FDI flows rather than the propensity for foreign entry. Although there is some evidence that technology sourcing is a consideration for both Japanese and US firms, the evidence tends to be 1 R&D intensity is measured as a ratio of total R&D expenditures divided by sales rather weak, with the R&D differential variables having coefficients significant only at the 10% level. Stronger evidence was found that US investments into the EC tended to be more motivated by tariff jumping considerations together with growth in European markets.
Finally, using similar R&D sum and differential measures to Kogut and Chang and to Neven and Siotis, Beladi et al (1999) find no evidence of technology sourcing by major investing countries into the United States over the periods 1980-86 and 1987-93 , and conclude that traditional firm-specific advantages are more likely to be the motivation for FDI. However, like the previous studies, Beladi et al do find evidence that FDI is more likely to occur in industries where overall R&D expenditures are high. The message from these empirical studies appears to be that domestic investment in R&D can indeed be associated with relatively high levels of FDI, but that there is relatively weak (at best) evidence for outright technology sourcing by inward investing firms.
This suggests something of a dichotomy between two strands of the literature. On the one hand, the literature on globalization of R&D and network linkages appears to provide evidence, albeit of an anecdotal and survey nature, of increasing internationalization of research related FDI, at least partly motivated by a desire to keep up with or access leading edge technologies internationally. On the other hand, the econometric evidence on foreign entry and overall FDI flows suggests at best weak evidence for the existence of technology sourcing on a systematic scale.
However, it may not be surprising that the technology sourcing motive fails to show strongly in previous analysis of aggregate FDI flows, as this effect would tend to be 'washed out' by the myriad other influences on overall FDI. This suggests that there is merit in examining not simply aggregate FDI flows, but in concentrating the analysis on those sectors and countries where, conceptually, there are grounds for believing the technology sourcing and technology exploiting effects are most likely to be clearly differentiated.
The present research attempts to do this by performing a panel analysis of manufacturing FDI flows between the United States and its major recipient/investing countries which not only examines the technology sourcing hypothesis for the sample overall, but does so separately for the 'Types' of investment identified in the classification of Patel and Vega (1999 
Empirical Model
Empirical testing of the technology sourcing hypothesis should be placed within a plausible model of FDI. One model, which has been widely tested, suggests that the optimal stock of foreign capital for any firm (K*) depends principally on the scale of demand in the recipient country (the 'market size' hypothesis), and on relative factor costs in the capital exporting and recipient countries, i.e.
where X f is demand in the host ('foreign') country and c f -c d is the unit cost differential between production in the host and home ('domestic') country. However, in any given period, actual and desired foreign capital stocks are unlikely to be equal as a result of adjustment costs and operating lags, such as delays in finding suitable overseas investments, delivery lags etc. (Barrell and Pain, 1996) . Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) will therefore be a lagged function of the difference between actual and desired capital stocks in previous periods, in addition to demand and factor cost issues. This can be considered as a partial adjustment model of the form:
where I t is the flow of FDI in year t, K t-1 is the lagged value of actual foreign capital stock, and γ is a distributed lag function. This can be rewritten:
Thus the flow of FDI depends both on the determinants of the optimal capital stock derived from equation (1), and on the lagged value of actual foreign capital stock Empirical testing takes the general form:
Specifications of this sort have been empirically tested for direct investment flows into the United Kingdom (Pain, 1993), South East Asia (Lucas, 1993) , Spain (BajoRubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994), Mexico (Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 2000) and for outward direct investment from the United States (Barrell and Pain, 1996) . In the estimations discussed below, an augmented version of this basic model is tested on panel data to distinguish between the technology sourcing and technology exploiting hypotheses.
Data
The Neven and Siotis (1996) and Beladi et al (1999) observe that sectoral R&D intensities across countries tend to be highly correlated, and instead employ the sum and difference of R&D intensities between host and home countries which tend to show much lower correlation 3 . Therefore RDSUM it controls for the effect of 2 Cost of capital differentials are not include in the estimation because they tend to display little variation by sector and because the empirical evidence on FDI flows suggests they tend to have an insignificant effect, unlike relative unit labour costs (Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero 1994; Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 2000) . 3 This is true also of the present data set. For example, in the inward FDI sample the correlation coefficient between US and foreign RDI is 0.46, while that between RDSUM and RDDIF is 0.24.
technology as a transferable asset in FDI, while RDDIF it (host minus home) tests for the motivational influence: a positive coefficient on RDDIF suggests the technology sourcing motive, while a negative coefficient indicates technology exploitation.
Measures are also included to allow for the possible impact on FDI of tariff and nontariff barriers at the industry level, to account for the possible 'tariff-jumping' motive and to allow for the move towards increased reliance on non-tariff trade bariers during the period in question. TAR i is the production-weighted average of ad valorem tariff rates per sector in the host country, and NTB i is a frequency ratio indicating the percentage of national tariff lines which are affected by major non-tariff barriers such as quotas and voluntary export restraints. Full details of the data sources can be found in the data appendix.
The estimating equation is thus:
where µ it = α i + ϖ t + υ it . This is the standard 'random effects' model outlined in Baltagi (1995) . 
Results

a) Outward FDI
The results of panel data estimation for outward US direct investment to the seven recipient countries are considered first. The procedure involves estimating equation For the overall estimation, missing data reduced the 735 possible observations to 704 actual observations. These results are given in Table 2 . Column (a) shows the OLS regression results, which simply pools together all observations. The OLS results
show highly significant coefficients for RDSUM and RDDIF, apparently indicating Soete (1987) and used subsequently by Cantwell (1989) . Almeida (1996) also makes use of a similar index. Soete's RTA index uses patents rather than R&D expenditure, and is thus an output rather than an input measure. However, Soete (1987) (5) are therefore undertaken for observations falling into these two categories.
Columns (d) and (e) respectively of Overall, these results suggest there is little support for the technology sourcing hypothesis with respect to FDI flows between the United States and its major recipient nations, even for those sectors in which such an effect might be most likely.
This contrasts with the results of Neven and Siotis (1996) who performed a similar analysis 9 on FDI flows between the United States and four EU countries over the period 1984-89 and found some (weak) evidence to support the technology sourcing hypothesis. The difference between the present results and those of Neven and Siotis may be partly due to the longer time period and more extensive group of countries which employed here, but is more probably a result of the use of full panel estimation which Neven and Siotis were unable to undertake. In addition, Neven and 8 The variables used to measure R&D intensity (RDI it ) and revealed technological advantage (RTA it ) are not highly correlated. For the outward FDI sample, the correlation coefficients between RDI it and RTA it are 0.123 for the host countries and 0.368 for the United States, while for the inward FDI sample the equivalent correlation coefficients are 0.076 for the home countries and 0.385 for the United States. 9 However, Neven and Siotis did not attempt to break their sample into Type 1 and Type 2 categories.
Siotis did not allow for the unit labour cost or lagged stock effects included in the present model.
b) Inward FDI
The next stage is to test for the existence of technology sourcing in FDI into the United States from the same seven major investing countries. In most cases a twoway panel estimation was conducted on inward FDI flows, because of the existence of significant time period effects 10 . With one exception, fixed effects estimation was found to be appropriate. Table 3 shows the results of the basic model on 473 available observations 11 . As with the outward FDI estimations, the tariff and nontariff barrier variables consistently had insignificant coefficients and were dropped from the analysis. Table 3 shows two versions of this inward model; in the first, the unit cost differential is as before (column a), and the alternative is RULC it , a measure of the home countries' unit labour costs relative to the OECD sectoral average (column b). The results are somewhat stronger than for the outward FDI estimation.
The positive and significant coefficients on RDSUM suggest that R&D intensive sectors are more likely to attract inward investment into the United States. However, in both estimations the coefficient on RDDIF is negative, and in one estimation it is significant at the 10% level, suggesting that for inward FDI flows into these US sectors, the technology exploiting motive predominates. ULCDIF/RULC and K t-1 have coefficients with the correct sign, but are statistically insignificant. The models have an adjusted R 2 of 0.37, considerably higher than for the outward FDI estimations.
As with the outward estimations, separate panel estimations can be performed for Type 1 and Type 2 investments 12 . The Type 1 estimation, which accounts for 20% of the total observations, shows the first suggestion of support for the technology souring hypothesis, ( 
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to add to the developing literature on technology sourcing versus technology exploitation as a motivation for FDI. Unlike previous research I have been able to undertake panel analysis of manufacturing FDI flows in both directions between the United States and its major investing/recipient nations.
In addition, I performed separate estimations for clusters of FDI observations which 13 For inward investment this category includes textiles; paper, printing and publishing; rubber and plastics; the conceptual literature suggests are most likely to exhibit different technologyrelated investing behaviour. As far as I am aware, this is the first empirical use of Patel and Vega's (1999) There is little in these results to support the concerns expressed in Kogut and Chang (1991) and Neven and Siotis (1996) Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% on a two-tailed t-test.
